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CAN WE TALK?: A "STEELE-Y"
ANALYSIS OF ABA OPINION 4111
Frederick C. Moss*
William J. Bridge**
N August 1998, the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility of the American Bar Association issued Opinion 98-411, "Ethi-
cal Issues in Lawyer-to-Lawyer Consultation."'2 In this Article, we
describe and evaluate the Opinion. We conclude that the Opinion may
well contain, as Walter Steele might suspect, more noise than practical
consequence. In trying to be practical, and in dealing with a common and
traditional practice, the Committee reaches conclusions that are few,
based on little authority in the Model Rules, and tenuously supported in
other law governing lawyer's obligations to clients and others. The Com-
mittee's main intent is not to discourage lawyers' consultations with each
other for the benefit of their clients. Its main tactic is to establish, if only
by repetition, that a client-lawyer relationship does not arise between the
consulting lawyer's client and the consulted lawyer. Thus, if a consulted
lawyer makes no promise, he is free of any ethical obligation to the con-
sulting lawyer's client.
* Associate Professor of Law; Southern Methodist University School of Law; A.B.,
1965, Georgetown University; J.D., 1968, Villanova University, LL.M., 1977, Harvard Law
School.
** Associate Professor of Law; Southern Methodist University School of Law;
B.S.F.S., 1970, Georgetown University; J.D., 1974, Georgetown University.
1. We write this essay to honor Professor Walter W. Steele, Jr., a fellow teacher of
Professional Responsibility at Southern Methodist University School of Law for twenty
years until his too-early retirement. Over that time, we have become familiar with, and
often appreciate, not only Walter's point of view, but also his inimitable style. To be blunt,
as he always is, Walter is both a born skeptic and a plain talker. In this essay, we attempt
an appropriately "Steele-y" evaluation of American Bar Association Ethics Opinion 98-
411, which we think Walter would view with some skepticism. We choose Opinion 98-411
because it deals with "lawyer-to-lawyer consultation," a topic dear to Walter's heart (if not
his pocketbook), since he now practices part-time as a professional legal ethics consultant.
We also choose Opinion 98-411 because it raises as many questions as it attempts to an-
swer. We think Walter would agree. After reading the Opinion, he would wag his head,
stroke his beard, and drawl, "Now, just a minute. Lemme get this straight. You mean to
tell me ... ?" What would follow might be sarcastic; it would definitely be blunt; and it
would demonstrate a thorough and sophisticated command of the theory and practicalities
of lawyers' ethical obligations.
2. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. 98-411 (1998) [here-
inafter Op. 411] (ABAIBNA Lawyers Manual of Professional Conduct 101:140 (1998))
(LEXIS, Ethics Library, Fopin File) (WESTLAW ABA-ETHOP database).
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I. THE OPINION: A NEUTRAL DESCRIPTION
The Opinion has three parts, the first describing the forms consulta-
tions may take, and the next two parts discussing the problems of the
consulting lawyer and the consulted lawyer respectively. 3 The Opinion
addresses consultations with lawyers outside the consulting lawyer's firm
who are not associated in the representation of this client on this matter.
It recognizes the value of consultation, not only to less experienced law-
yers with no in-firm colleague in the same area, but also to more exper-
ienced lawyers seeking to benefit from the experience and expertise of
others. Consultations range from a single question on an abstract issue of
law or a point of local practice, through a broad middle range, to a
lengthy detailed account of specific facts related to an identified client.4
In the Opinion, the major issue for the consulting lawyer is confidenti-
ality. Putting purely legal or informational questions to the consulted
lawyer raises no concern of revealing Rule 1.6 information. An anony-
mous recount of information, or a question posed in hypothetical form,
similarly raises no question. 5 In any but the most limited general consul-
tation, however, Ting is revealing information relating to the representa-
tion covered by Model Rule 1.6, and therefore must do so within the
limits of that Rule. When it is reasonably foreseeable that Ted could later
link Ting's client information not otherwise generally known, and the in-
formation may prejudice or embarrass the client, Ting must obtain ex-
plicit client consent.6 Further, when Ting seeks to reveal privileged
information linked to an identifiable client, she must also seek explicit
consent. In any case, client consent is the surest safeguard for the con-
sulting lawyer.7 Aside from that, the Opinion relies upon "impliedly au-
thorized" disclosures. 8 The Opinion concludes that a lawyer is impliedly
authorized to reveal information relating to the representation of a client
when she reasonably believes the disclosure will further the representa-
tion by using Ted's experience or expertise. 9 The Committee's advice to a
lawyer thinking of consulting another lawyer is to obtain her client's con-
sent, to be careful not to seek a lawyer who may represent the opposing
party, and to obtain the other lawyer's promises to keep the information
confidential and not to undertake representation adverse to her client.10
Finally, the Opinion turns to three major questions for the consulted
lawyer. First, the Committee, almost too adamantly, opines that no cli-
ent-lawyer relationship exists between Ting's client and Ted unless there
3. For convenience's sake, we name the consulting lawyer "Ting" and the consulted
lawyer "Ted." For style's sake, we treat Ting as female and Ted as male.
4. See Op. 411, 3.
5. See Op. 411, 9 6.
6. See Op. 411, 9.
7. See Op. 411, 10.
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (a) (1998).
9. See Op. 411, 1 5.
10. See Op. 411, 91 10-12.
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is an explicit engagement." Second, the Committee concludes that Ted is
not obliged to keep Ting's client's information confidential unless Ted
promises to do so. The promise can be express or implied. A promise of
confidentiality is implied either when Ting conditions revealing the infor-
mation upon confidentiality 12 or when the nature of the information
would lead a reasonable lawyer in Ted's position to conclude that confi-
dentiality was expected.13 Third, the Opinion warns Ted about obliga-
tions to his clients. Ideally, Ted should identify Ting's client to ensure
that there is no conflict with his existing clients. Moreover, Ted must not
harm a client by his advice to Ting, and, if Ted does so inadvertently, he
must disclose that to his client. Finally, Ted should seek a waiver from
Ting's client so that Ted may represent a client with adverse interests.
Absent a waiver, Ted should at least seek Ting's client's consent to
screening so that Ted's law firm may undertake adverse representation.14
II. DODGING CONSULTATIONS FOR THE
LAWYER'S BENEFIT
At the outset, the Opinion limits the scope of its discussion. The Com-
mittee divides legal consultations into two basic categories: consultations
for the benefit of the lawyer and those for the benefit of the client. The
first category includes consultations by lawyers who represent clients
when the lawyers have questions concerning the lawyers' ethical duties
vis-A-vis the client. For example, if a lawyer were not getting along with
her client, she might call an ethics expert15 to ask whether she could ethi-
cally "fire" the client. This consultation is not to benefit the client, but
rather the lawyer. The Opinion, in its own words, "does not necessarily
apply to or discuss all of the ethical issues" concerning lawyer-benefit
consultations.16 "Not necessarily" is hedging language1 7 obscuring any
assistance in this important kind of consulting. Nothing in the Opinion
discusses lawyer-benefit consultations explicitly, so it is unclear why the
Opinion equivocates. The Opinion either applies or it does not; it ap-
pears not. 18
11. See Op. 411, T 14.
12. For example, "I have this interesting case. Can I ask you about it, just between
us?"
13. See Op. 411, 17.
14. See Op. 411, 11 19 - 25.
15. Experts include law professors, especially those with beards. Walter Steele's ethics
consultation practice grew as his beard did.
16. Op. 411, n.1.
17. Hedging is a tactic Walter Steele never uses.
18. As limited, the Opinion does not discuss the ethical duties of the consulted lawyer
vis-A-vis the lawyer consulting for her own benefit. The consulting lawyer may well be the
consulted lawyer's client in this situation. Unexplored in Opinion 98-411 is whether this
kind of consultation could be general enough so as not to create a client-lawyer relation-
ship. If so, it would matter a great deal when the lawyers cross the line into becoming
lawyer and client. Another issue, paralleling the discussion in Opinion 411, is whether the
consulting lawyer may reveal client information in the course of the consultation, absent
client consent. It is hardly plausible that the consulting lawyer is "impliedly authorized" to
reveal client information when the consultation is not for the client's benefit. Of course,
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III. THE RULES OF "ENGAGEMENT:" WHITHER
OPINION 97-407?
The remaining category of legal consultations are those for the benefit
of the client. Here, a lawyer seeks ethical or legal advice or information19
that will assist in the representation of a client. For example, the lawyer
may seek the advice of an ethics expert on whether there are grounds to
move to disqualify opposing counsel. Or the lawyer may seek the advice
of a practitioner more experienced in a particular field of law whether a
certain theory of recovery could be maintained on a particular set of
facts.
After setting aside consultations for the benefit of the lawyer, the Com-
mittee further limits the scope of Opinion 98-411 by distinguishing con-
sultations where there is an intent to engage the consulted lawyer's
services from those where there is no intent to engage. The Opinion ex-
cludes the former kind of consultation from its scope, without explana-
tion.20 We "suspicion" 21 that the reason for excluding formally engaged
legal experts is because the Committee wanted to limit the reach of Opin-
ion 97-407.22 Opinion 97-407 addresses the ethical duties of lawyers hired
as either consulting or testifying legal experts. To an astute and blunt
observer, Opinion 97-407 is directly relevant to issues addressed in Opin-
ion 98-411, but the Committee never cites it. If Opinion 97-407 was not
deemed relevant to the subject of Opinion 98-411, it may be because the
Committee wishes to limit the earlier Opinion to lawyers who are for-
mally retained as experts.
At first blush, Opinion 98-411 seems contrary to Opinion 97-407.
Opinion 97-407 takes the position that a lawyer hired to be a non-testify-
ing consulting expert has a client-lawyer relationship with the consulting
lawyer's client. This conclusion of Opinion 97-407 has the potential to
include every lawyer consulted by another lawyer, no matter how briefly
or informally. Clearly, the Committee seeks to avoid this result. Its ob-
jective is to keep informal legal consultations as free as possible from
ethical restrictions that might discourage a lawyer from seeking advice
some ethics consultations could benefit both the consulting lawyer and her client. Whether
that is true may depend on the content of the consulted lawyer's advice as well as the
purpose of the consultation. See Drew L. Kershen, The Ethics of Ethics Consultation, 6
PROF. LAw. 1 (1995).
19. Information includes a research lead, specific rules of law, or folklore aboutjudges' behavior. Advice, on the other hand, means guidance more tailored to Ting's cli-
ent's specific needs.
20. "This opinion discusses the ethical issues raised when one lawyer consults about a
client matter with another lawyer who is neither a member of the consulting lawyer's firm
nor otherwise associated on the matter, and where there is no intent to engage the con-
sulted lawyer's services." Op. 411, 1 2. We assume that by "engage" the Opinion means
the explicit formation of a client-attorney relationship with Ted, presumably between Ted
and Ting's client.
21. As Walter would say.




from another lawyer.23 To do this the Committee had to limit Opinion
97-407. Creating a relatively "ethics free" consultation zone would be
impossible if all consulted lawyers had a professional relationship with
the consulting lawyer's client. They tamed Opinion 97-407 by resorting to
"engagement." But, as Walter might say, "that ol' dog won't hunt."
First, it is quixotic to posit that the existence of a client-lawyer relation-
ship between Ted and Ting's client is determined by the presence of a
formal engagement. It just ain't so. As the Committee itself recognizes
in Opinion 97-407, whether a client-lawyer relationship arises is a matter
of law beyond the scope of the rules of ethics.24 Legally, it is clear that
the formation of that relationship does not depend upon a formal reten-
tion agreement or any other single criterion.25 Nevertheless, Opinion 98-
411 explicitly states that when there is no intent to engage the consulted
lawyer, no client-lawyer relationship is formed between the consulted
lawyer and the consulting lawyer's client. 26
23. The Opinion states near its conclusion, "This opinion is not intended and should
not be interpreted to discourage the practice of consulting between lawyers." Op. 411,
26. Earlier, it notes that "[S]eeking advice from knowledgeable colleagues is an important,
informal component of a lawyer's ongoing professional development. Testing ideas about
complex or vexing cases can be beneficial to a lawyer's client." Id. T 3. "Even the most
experienced lawyers sometimes will find it useful to consult others who practice in the
same area to get the benefit of their expertise on a difficult or unusual problem." Id. 2.
24. ABA Opinion 97-407 recognizes that it is beyond the powers of the Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility to declare when a client-lawyer relationship comes
into being. It states:
[tihe Model Rules note that 'whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for
any specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question
of fact.' Thus, the question whether a testifying expert and the party for
whom he is expected to testify have formed a relationship sufficient to in-
voke the ethical obligations of the Model Rules is generally a question of fact
determined by principles beyond those set forth in the Model Rules.
Op. 407, 7 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope [15] (1983)).
Ignoring this disclaimer almost instantaneously, the Committee declares that a testifying
legal expert does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the party for whom she is testi-
fying, while a purely consulting expert does occupy "the role of co-counsel in the matter as
to the area upon which she is consulted and is subject to all of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct." Id., 91 13. It may be unfair to charge the Committee with acting ultra
vires, for many of a lawyer's professional obligations depend upon the existence of a client-
lawyer relationship. Perhaps the Committee should be direct about the legal contingency
and phrase its advice in the conditional. For example, "if under the law of the jurisdiction,
a client-lawyer relationship exists, then "x", if not, then "y."
25. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (Proposed Official
Draft 1996):
§ 26. Formation of Client-Lawyer Relationship
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide
legal services for the person; and either
(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the
lawyer to provide the services; ....
Id. at 8. Comment c. states, "No written agreement is required in order to establish the
relationship." See cases cited infra note 47.
26. See Op. 411, 15. See also Op. 411, 1 14, 24, 26.
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Second, the Opinion seems to say that its conclusions hold no matter
how much client information is communicated to Ted or how much work
Ted does, as long as Ted is not "engaged. ' 27 Is the Committee saying that,
even when he learns sensitive, confidential details of Ting's case and con-
sults at length with Ting's client, Ted cannot be the client's lawyer simply
because there is no formal retainer? 28
This is not to say that Opinion 98-411 might not be perfectly correct in
other respects. The Opinion envisions what we call the "quickie con-
sult."'29 The "quickie consult" occurs when a lawyer calls a colleague at
another firm or a former law professor to pose a hypothetical situation.
The example the Opinion uses is when the lawyer asks a generic legal
question of a CLE speaker. The question might grow from a real case,
but contains no identifying information. Opinion 98-411 plainly sees no
client-lawyer relationship between the answerer and the questioner's cli-
ent. That seems beyond dispute, although it remains a legal rather than
an ethical question, and thus beyond the reach of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.30
To assign a client-lawyer relationship to the consultant based upon
whether he is "engaged" is over-inclusive. It is entirely possible that a
consultant would accept a fee for a hypothetical consultation. It is not
uncommon for lawyers who call their law professors to ask hypothetical
questions, to insist that the teacher be paid for her time,31 especially
where the consultation may take hours of discussion and research. It
seems that agreeing to accept a fee is a trap for the naive law professor.
If one agrees with Opinion 98-411's goal of keeping hypothetical consul-
tations as unencumbered as possible by the rules of ethics, then it makes
little sense to base the creation of a full-blown client-lawyer relationship
upon the payment of a fee. One searches in vain in Opinion 98-411 for a
way to keep the paid hypothetical consultation from falling into the
clutches of Opinion 97-407's client-lawyer relationship. Take the money
and you can't run.32
IV. THE MIDDLE GROUND: ETHICAL SWAMPLAND?
The Opinion identifies a broad middle ground between the "quickie
consult" and the formal engagement. Ting may reveal varying amounts
of confidential client information, ranging from merely identifying the cli-
ent to imparting detailed case information and privileged communica-
27. See Op. 411, 24.
28. Rhetorical questions, particularly with a skeptical undertone, although (or perhaps
because) disfavored by law review editors, are a staple of Walter Steele's conversation.
29. See Op. 411, 1 3.
30. See supra note 24.
31. The professor would of course never insist on a fee, at least before retirement.
32. One way out is to interpret Opinion 407 as imposing a client-lawyer relationship
only upon the paid legal expert who becomes an integral part of the client's legal team, not
merely someone consulted "in passing." This raises obvious difficulties in line-drawing.
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tions to Ted, even though not engaged. It is on these middle cases that
the Opinion focuses most of its discussion.
The Opinion recognizes that in these middle cases, even without a cli-
ent-lawyer relationship, things can get ethically tricky. Information Ting
learns as a result of her representation is confidential under Rule 1.6.
This information includes privileged communications and unprivileged in-
formation learned in the course of representing the client. The latter cat-
egory of information includes the client's identity. Knowing that lawyers
who consult others on legal questions often must reveal Rule 1.6 informa-
tion to ensure that the advice takes into account all relevant information,
and that, often, consulting lawyers do not obtain their client's consent to
these disclosures, the Opinion explores the territory of "impliedly author-
ized" disclosures.33
V. TING'S IMPLIED AUTHORITY: CAN SHE TALK?
The Opinion first seems to create a hitherto unknown exception to the
duty of confidentiality. In discussing the position that the client's iden-
tity, though rarely privileged under evidentiary rules, is usually confiden-
tial under Rule 1.6, the Opinion states that "if it is public knowledge [for
example] that a lawyer represents a particular criminal defendant, the de-
fense lawyer may reveal that fact in a consultation without violating Rule
1.6, although disclosure of other facts not publicly known may be a viola-
tion."'34 This seems to say that information learned in the course of rep-
resenting a client is not covered by Rule 1.6 if is it publicly known. Whoa,
Bubba. The Rule contains no such exception. 35
It is not correct to say that confidential information of a current client
is not protected by Rule 1.6 if the information is "public knowledge" or
"generally known." A lawyer is not free to disclose client information
just because it is public knowledge. Given the context of the reference to
publicly known client information, however, the Opinion may mean
merely that the determination whether a lawyer is impliedly authorized
to reveal Rule 1.6 information may depend in part upon whether the
information is public. Often lawyers must decide during the consultation
what information to disclose and what to withhold in order to receive
useful advice. It is not practical for the lawyer to obtain client consent in
advance to the disclosure of all necessary facts. Ting may not know what
information Ted needs to render a useful opinion. Public access to the
information is one factor Ting may consider when deciding whether she is
impliedly authorized to reveal client information.
33. See Op. 411, 1 4 - 5.
34. Op. 411, n.6.
35. If the Committee really means what it says, it seems to have grafted a concept
from Rule 1.9(c)(1) onto Rule 1.6. Rule 1.9 allows a lawyer to use information relating to
the representation of a former client to the disadvantage of the former client if the infor-




Eschewing 36 the easy out by saying that all disclosures to Ted for the
benefit of Ting's client are impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) "in
order to carry out the representation," the Opinion limits Ting's implied
authority to disclose. While these limits are practical, even common-
sense, they are fabricated out of whole cloth. The Opinion cites no rules,
opinions, case law, or commentary to support its conclusions. 37
The Opinion holds that the lawyer is not impliedly authorized to reveal
client information not publicly known if disclosure would prejudice or
embarrass the client.38 Disclosing such information without the client's
consent, says the Opinion, may violate the duty of confidentiality under
Rule 1.6. This is an unremarkable comment, but unsupported by the
Rule or other authority. 39 Does this mean that Ting is impliedly author-
ized to reveal information harmful to her client as long as it is public
knowledge, or non-harmful information that is not? n° It is not clear that
the answer to these essential questions is, "yes."
In the next paragraph, the Opinion adds another limit to Ting's implied
authority to disclose client information. It says, "If ... the [consulting
lawyer] ... is likely to reveal information that would prejudice the client
or that the client would not want disclosed, then he must obtain client
consent for the consultation. '41 Here the Opinion seems to distinguish
between prejudicial and non-prejudicial information that "the client
would not want disclosed." We suppose that it is possible that Ting could
somehow understand that the client would not want her to reveal certain
information that is not prejudicial but nevertheless private or embarrass-
ing to the client or others, but this limit seems merely to state a truism: a
lawyer is not impliedly authorized to reveal information that the lawyer
knows (or suspects?) the client would not want disclosed. Perhaps the
Committee, abundantly cautious, thought it best to make this explicit.
The caution may not be misplaced, since Ting is discussing the client's
matter with Ted without telling her client.
Finally, the Opinion sketches the limits of Ting's implied authority:
"When the consulting lawyer determines that the consultation requires
disclosure of client information protected by the attorney-client privilege
or that foreseeably might harm the client if disclosed, the lawyer must
assure that the client is made aware of the potential consequences of the
disclosure and that the client grants permission to consult the other law-
yer."'42 The Opinion notes that the unauthorized disclosure of privileged
36. Do not see supra note 21.
37. See Op. 411, 1$ 8 - 9.
38. See Op. 411, 18.
39. The Committee seems to be alluding to DR 4-101's definition of a client "secret,"
that is, unprivileged "information gained in the professional relationship that the client has
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be
likely to be detrimental to the client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILrr
DR 4-101(A) (1980).
40. Another "Steele-y" rhetorical question.
41. Op. 411, 9.
42. Op. 411, 10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (b)(1)(1983).
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information might amount to a waiver of the privilege. For that reason,
the Opinion flatly states that a lawyer does not have implied authority to
disclose privileged information.4 3
Distilling the Opinion's statements into a rule of implied authority to
disclose, the Opinion seems to say that, without express client consent, a
lawyer has implied authority to reveal any information relating to repre-
sentation of a client if it would assist the lawyer in carrying out the repre-
sentation of the client, unless (1) the information is not public knowledge
and disclosure may prejudice or embarrass the client; (2) the client would
not want the information disclosed; (3) the information is protected by
client-attorney privilege; or (4) the client expressly instructs the lawyer
not to reveal the information. Limit (1) merely contains factors bearing
on limit (2), that is, the lawyer's decision whether the client would not
want the information revealed. Exception (4), not discussed in the Opin-
ion, is added because it is obvious and the Opinion should have included
it.4
4
VI. WALKIN' THE LINE 45 BETWEEN OPINIONS 90-358
AND 97-407
The Committee is not only concerned about Ting's obligation of confi-
dentiality, but also whether Ted has duties grounded in Rule 1.6. First,
the Committee considers Ting's client's beliefs about Ted's duty of confi-
dentiality. The Opinion ventures, "[i]f the client's consent to the consul-
tation was sought and obtained, the client may have a reasonable
expectation that the disclosure will go no further than the consulted law-
yer and will not be used adversely. '46 The "reasonable expectation" lan-
guage sounds like the criterion used when a client-lawyer relationship is
found between a putative client and an attorney who claims not to have
43. The Opinion must address the danger of waiver because it concludes that, unless
Ted is retained as such, he does not act as a lawyer for Ting's client. If there were a client-
lawyer relationship, the waiver problem disappears. The Opinion does not discuss the pos-
sibility that disclosure of privileged information to the consulted lawyer, as a sub-agent or
representative of the consulting lawyer, may continue to be protected within the consulting
lawyer's attorney-client privilege. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.
1989) (accountant); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (accountant); Men-
denhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. I11. 1982) (foreign patent agent); In
re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994) (independent consultant found to be a represen-
tative of the client in dealing with counsel); Uniform Rule of Evidence 502, 510 (1986).
Because jurisdictions may differ on this and the issue is intensely factual, the Opinion does
not assume that disclosures in the course of a legal consultation are protected by the
privilege.
44. Unlike Disciplinary Rule 4-101 of the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILrry, Rule 1.6(a) does not explicitly state that a lawyer may not reveal information
the client has expressly forbidden the lawyer to disclose. See supra note 39. However,
comment [7] to Rule 1.6 states, "A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures
about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent
that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority." MODEL RuLEs
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 7 (1998).
45. JOHNNY CASH, I Walk the Line (Sun Records 1956) (also recorded by more than
100 other artists, but the original would be Walter's favorite).
46. Op. 411, 13.
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entered a relationship.4 7 Nevertheless, the Opinion steadfastly refuses to
find a client-lawyer relationship between Ted and Ting's client. Accord-
ing to the Committee, Ting's client cannot reasonably conclude that Ted
is her lawyer, but she may reasonably conclude that Ted must keep her
information confidential.48 We are left to guess exactly how the client is
protected by her "reasonable expectation" of confidentiality. The Opin-
ion declares that, absent a promise, Ted has no obligation to keep the
information confidential. Ting's client must hope that Ted is a generous
stranger who just happens to be discreet.
One possible way to protect Ting's client would be to analogize to
Opinion 90-358.49 This approach is foreclosed by the committee. Opinion
98-411 states, "[t]he reasonable expectations of a prospective client that
support the imposition of a duty of confidentiality when the lawyer is
consulted about a possible representation cannot be said to exist in law-
yer-to-lawyer consultations in which the client is not directly involved."'5"
Here Opinion 98-411 tries to walk a tightrope between Opinion 90-358,
imposing a Rule 1.6 duty of confidentiality on a lawyer initially consulted
by a potential client, and Opinion 97-407, imposing a client-lawyer rela-
tionship on a retained legal consultant. The premise for not finding that
Ted has a Rule 1.6-based obligation of confidentiality to Ting's client is
that the client is not "directly involved." "Direct involvement," however,
is not a necessary element of a client-lawyer relationship. 5' It is odd that
it is a prerequisite for a Rule 1.6 obligation of confidentiality. We find
this analysis as leaky as a bad bait bucket.
47. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26, supra note 25. Com-
ment b. to § 26 states, "A lawyer may be held to [the] responsibility of representation when
the client reasonably relies on the existence of the relationship." Comment e. to § 26
states, "Even when a lawyer has not communicated willingness to represent a person, a
client-lawyer relationship arises when the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to pro-
vide services, and the lawyer, who reasonably should know of this reliance, does not inform
the person that the lawyer will not do so." See also In the Matter of Anonymous, 655
N.E.2d 67,70 (Ind. 1995); Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn.
1980); Rice v. Forestier, 415 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
48. See Op. 411, 14.
49. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990)
found that confidential communications made to a lawyer by a prospective client are pro-
tected by Rules 1.6 and 1.7 even when the lawyer is not ultimately retained by the prospec-
tive client. To the same effect is RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 27
and the following cases: Westinghouse Electric Corp. v Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311,
1319 & n. 12 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); First American Carriers, Inc.
v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669 (Ark. 1990); Liesman v. Liesman, 617 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994); Desbiens v. Ford Motor Co., 439 N.Y.S. 2d 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
See also Ainsworth Electric Co. v. Alcatel Canada Wire Inc., 40 O.R.3d 123 (Ont. Ct. Gen.
Dev. 1998).
50. Op. 411, 9 16.
51. Clarke v. Ruffino, 819 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ
dism'd w.o.j.); Insurance Company of North America v. Westergren, 794 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ); Howard v. Texas Dep't Human Serv., 791 S.W.2d 313
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). ABA Opinion 97-407 recognizes that an attor-
ney-client relationship can exist between a client and a lawyer who has agreed only to
consult, not to represent the client at any proceeding. This conclusion does not seem to
depend upon whether the client is directly involved with the consultant.
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Let's see if we got this straight.52 Opinion 98-411 says that Ting's cli-
ent's information is protected if Ted is formally engaged as a consultant. 53
Without that engagement, somehow the information may still be pro-
tected if Ting's client has a reasonable expectation that Ted will keep it
confidential. Ting's client's expectation might be reasonable if she con-
sents to the consultation or is directly involved in it. Otherwise, Ted is
not only not a lawyer for Ting's client, he has no ethical duty of confiden-
tiality. Sounds as if the Committee wants to make sure that Ted is a
tough fish to hook. That same hook poses great danger to Ting.
VII. PROMISES, PROMISES 54
The Committee tries to reassure Ting, stating that "[slome protection
for a client may be afforded by obtaining the consulted lawyer's agree-
ment to hold information in confidence" and not to engage in adverse
representation.5 5 The Opinion does not discuss how such an agreement
might afford the client some protection. If Ted is not formally engaged, it
is not clear how Ting's client is legally or ethically protected by Ted's
naked promise of confidentiality. If Ted were to break his promise, what
recourse would Ting's client or Ting have? Would Ted violate a Model
Rule of Professional Conduct? Would Ting's client win a motion to dis-
qualify Ted from adverse representation? Would Ted be liable in a civil
action? 56
The Opinion is particularly opaque as to the source of Ted's ethical
duties once he has promised confidentiality. It says, "A consulted lawyer
who has not expressly or implicitly agreed to maintain the confidentiality
of client information acquired in a consultation should not be found to
have breached an ethical duty under Rule 1.6 if she later discloses or uses
the information. '57 The clear import of this sentence is that a lawyer who
has expressly or implicitly agreed to keep the client information confiden-
tial would breach Rule 1.6 if she later reveals the information. But this
cannot be true. Rule 1.6 imposes a duty of confidentiality only upon law-
yers who have gained information in the course of representing a client.5 8
Opinion 98-411 assumes that Ted is not representing Ting's client. In this
52. Do not see supra note 36.
53. See Op. 411, j 17.
54. NEIL SIMON, Promises, Promises (1968) (lyrics by Hal David, music by Burt
Bacharach) (one of Walter's favorite musicals).
55. Op. 411, IT 11 - 13. The Opinion recognizes that the existence of an engagement
agreement does not determine whether the attorney-client privilege is waived. However, in
most cases, communications with a formally engaged, non-testifying consultant are within
the consulting attorney's client-lawyer privilege. See supra note 43.
56. Ted may have fiduciary duties to Ting's client under agency law. While the Opin-
ion does recognize this at one point, citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, it
does not do so here. See infra note 66.
57. Op. 411, 18.
58. ABA Opinion 90-358 creates an exception to this. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Opinion 90-358 (1990). See supra note 49. There the Commit-
tee found that the Rule 1.6 duty of confidentiality applies to confidences conveyed to a
lawyer consulted by a prospective client even if a client-lawyer relationship is not formed.
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backhand way, the Committee attempts to blanket Ting's client with Rule
1.6 when Ted promises confidentiality, but leaves out in the cold Ting's
client who has no promise, but only reasonable expectations. The Com-
mittee does not share how reasonable expectations afford "some protec-
tion," nor how much "some" is.
The Opinion suggests that Ted will be obliged 59 to keep Ting's client's
information confidential not only if Ted expressly promises, but also if
Ted's promise "can or should" be inferred from the circumstances. 6° The
first example of an inferred agreement is exceedingly modest: Ting ex-
pressly conditions the consultation on confidentiality and Ted proceeds.
The second example is exceedingly vague: the nature of the information
disclosed would lead a reasonable lawyer to know that confidentiality is
"assumed and expected. '61
What Ting may have "assumed and expected" may not be what Ted
"assumed and expected." The Committee says that the reasonable law-
yer will break the deadlock. If Ted were unreasonable in believing that
Ting (on behalf of her client) did not expect confidentiality, then Ted im-
pliedly promised and is bound. The difficulty here is that absent Ted's
explicit promise or Ting's explicit waiver, Ted cannot know whether he is
bound to confidentiality. Ted is required to guess whether a decision-
maker will later find an implicit promise to protect Ting's client's infor-
mation. This uncertainty is a strong incentive for Ted to raise explicitly
the issue of confidentiality with Ting, and virtually guarantees that Ted
and Ting will have to negotiate Ted's duties to Ting's client.
The Committee also bases its conflict-of-interest analysis upon Rule
1.6, perhaps unnecessarily so.62 According to the Opinion, if Ted has not
agreed to keep Ting's client information confidential, Ted will not have a
conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 if he later learns the identity of Ting's
client and agrees to represent a client adverse to Ting's client in a matter
in which Ting's client's information may be used to her disadvantage. 63
Ted will not violate Rule 1.7(b)'s prohibition of "representation... mate-
rially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities . . . to a third person." 64
Ted's responsibility to Ting's client, a "third person" to Ted, arises only
because of his promise, express or implied, to maintain confidentiality.
The promise, according to the Committee, subjects Ted to a Rule 1.6 obli-
gation. By emphasizing the centrality of the promise, the Committee
seems to leave the client who has no promise, but merely a reasonable
However, in Opinion 98-411, the Committee refuses to apply the protections of Rule 1.6 to
the confidences of the party not directly involved in the consultation. See Op. 411, 16.
59. But, perhaps not by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
60. See Op. 411, 9 17.
61. It would be educational to parse the situations when confidentiality is assumed but
not expected, when it is expected but not assumed, when it is neither, and when it is both.
Only in the fourth case is Ted's agreement inferred.
62. See Op. 411, 1 24.
63. See Op. 411, 9 18.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1998).
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expectation of Ted's respect of confidentiality, without protection from
Ted's adverse representation.
VIII. THE INCONVENIENCE OF AGENCY LAW
Without Ted's express or implied agreement, the Committee finds that
there can be no violation of Rule 1.6 by Ted. Ted is free to disclose the
information, or to use it against Ting's client.65 Here, the Committee
drops a disclaiming footnote to Section 428 of the ALI's Restatement of
Agency Law.66 The Restatement's position on sub-agency is that a prin-
cipal's agent may, with the principal's express or implied authorization,
appoint sub-agents, who are agents of the principal, and who owe fiduci-
ary duties to the principal, even in the absence of contractual duties be-
tween principal and sub-agent. The principal's agreement giving rise to a
sub-agent's duties to the principal may be express or implied. 67 Opinion
98-411's reference to the Agency Restatement expresses the Committee's
belief that fiduciary duties arise only from express agreements. Opinion
98-411 has agency law upside down.68 Of course, the Committee prefers
that the fiduciary duties of a sub-agent attach only if Ting and Ted ex-
pressly agree. This further liberates the "quickie consult" from trouble-
some responsibilities that might discourage them. But wishing does not
make it so. So, if Ted's agreement to maintain confidentiality is inferred
from either circumstance (the consultation conditioned on confidential-
ity) or nature (information a reasonable lawyer would know is to be kept
confidential), the Committee concludes without authority that an agency-
based fiduciary duty of confidentiality does not arise. The possibility that
Ted, because he is a sub-agent, has fiduciary duties of loyalty and confi-
dentiality69 toward Ting's client complicates the picture considerably.
Even without the expressed or implied agreement the Committee relies
65. See Op. 411, 18.
66. See Op. 411, 18, and n.9; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 428
cmt. a (1958).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. a, and § 79 (1958); HAROLD GILL
REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, § 22.C
(2d ed. 1990).
68. The Committee could mean to say that Ted's ethical, as distinguished from his
legal, duties do not arise without express agreement. If so, then it seems inconsistent with
other portions of the Opinion where ethical, as distinguished from legal, duties are seen to
arise from Ted's implied agreement or even from Ting's client's reasonable expectation of
Ted's maintaining confidentiality.
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (agent may not take unfair
advantage of his position in use of information acquired because of his agency); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 391 (1958) (agent may not act on behalf of party adverse to
principal in transaction related to his agency); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393
(1958) (agent may not compete with the principal concerning subject matter of his agency);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 (1958) (agent may not act during the agency
for person whose interests conflict with those of principal in matters in which agent was
employed); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) (agent may not disclose or
use confidences of principal given to agent on account of his agency to injury of principal);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958) (agent's duty of confidentiality contin-
ues after termination of agency). Comment c. to § 387 states that the above duties apply to
a gratuitous agent as fully as to an agent who is paid for his services.
19991
SMU LAW REVIEW
upon, the law of agency may be the source of the "responsibilities.. . to a
third person" that may materially limit Ted's representation of an adverse
client under Rule 1.7(b). 711 Moreover, if Ted fears a claim by Ting's client
for breach of fiduciary duty arising from agency law, then Ted's own in-
terests may also preclude representation adverse to Ting's client. An-
other non-hunting dog, it seems.
IX. THE ALMOST ETHICS-FREE ZONE
As for the consultation which becomes "un-anonymous" when Ted
later learns enough from other sources to connect the dots, the Commit-
tee rejects what it calls a "springing" duty of confidentiality under Rule
1.6.71 Its reasoning is as circular as it seems. The only reason no duty
arises later is because there was no duty before. No client-lawyer rela-
tionship exists, and therefore there is no duty. If Ted has not promised
confidentiality, there is no duty. The fact that Ted later links Ting's infor-
mation to an identified client is irrelevant.
The example the Committee uses is stark, even shocking. Ting consults
Ted hypothetically about a tax question, without securing a promising of
confidentiality. Later, a new client retains Ted to represent him in a di-
vorce. In the initial interview, Ted realizes that the new client is the
spouse of Ting's client in the tax consultation. The Opinion holds that
Ted may represent the new client in the divorce, and may reveal or use
Ting's client's information in the representation. Ted is not limited, even
if hindsight clearly shows that Ting should have secured a promise of con-
fidentiality or anticipated Ted's later identifying the client. The example
drives a wedge between Ting and Ted. Tings learn always to secure a
promise, while Teds learn never to give one. 72
While Ted thus remains relatively free to undertake new representa-
tion, assisting Ting may impose obligations on Ted vis-a-vis his existing
clients. To warn Ted to be cautious when talking to Ting, the Committee
uses another example.73 In it, Ted, who normally represents landlords is
consulted by Ting who represents a tenant seeking to avoid an onerous
lease. As the world turns, Ting's client is a tenant of Ted's client. Ted has
harmed his client, even if unknowingly. The Committee delicately notes
that, if the consultation becomes known, it "may well affect the consulted
lawyer's relationship with her landlord client adversely. ' 74 The Opinion
faults Ted's failure to "clear conflicts," even though there is no client-
70. Op. 411, 1 19.
71. Op. 411, 18.
72. See Op. 411, 18. If Ted reveals Ting's client's information, uses it, abuses it, or
harms Ting's client by means of the consultation, the Committee's aim appears to be that
Ted run afoul of no Rule. On the other hand, Ting's selection of Ted, her failure to secure
a promise of confidentiality, or her not sufficiently masking the facts to disguise her client's
identity, may be incompetence under Rule 1.1. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCr Rule 1.1 (1998).
73. See Op. 411, 1 20.
74. Op. 411, 1 21. The words "mad as hell" come to mind, and not merely because
they would come to Walter Steele's mind.
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lawyer relationship with Ting's client. If the consultation was both anon-
ymous and hypothetical, however, even the most effective conflicts-
checking system would not sound the alarm. The Committee's concludes
that if there was no agreement to keep Ting's client's information confi-
dential, Rule 1.4 requires Ted to inform his client of the consultation and
its possible consequences. 75 Leaving aside the delicacy of that conversa-
tion, possible consequences for Ted's client range from losing the case to,
at the least, a weakened position costing more money and time. 76
If Ted had agreed to keep Ting's tenant-client's information confiden-
tial, must Ted honor that agreement? The Committee position is that Ted
"may have" to refrain from representing "a long-time client of the firm
who wants the firm to pursue a breach of lease action."'77 While the Com-
mittee does not explicitly say so, Ted's law firm may also be unable to
represent the client. The basis of Ted's obligation to decline representa-
tion is grounded in Rule 1.7(b), 78 thus Ted's firm too must send the client
elsewhere under Rule 1.10(a). The Committee notes, not in this discus-
sion, but a few paragraphs away, that neither Ted nor his firm may be free
to explain why they must decline to represent the landlord. 79
Without an agreement of confidentiality with Ting, Ted, while less at
risk, is still not home free. First, the Committee confidently asserts that
Ted may be charged with violating Rule 1.7(b) for failure to employ rea-
sonable measures to avoid conflicts of interest.80 A bit curious, for Rule
1.7(b) does not, nor does any other Rule, except perhaps Rule 5.1(a),
require a lawyer to take prophylactic measures to avoid violating a rule.
To be sure, the first paragraph of the comment to Rule 1.7 advises a law-
yer to adopt reasonable procedures, 81 but, as the first paragraph of the
Scope note of the Model Rules makes clear, "[clomments do not add
obligations to the Rules. '8 2 The Rules themselves generally address,
frustratingly for some observers, only primary conduct, and rarely speak
to avoiding potential violations of the Rules. Put more directly, as Walter
Steele certainly would prefer, the Rule prohibits conflicted representa-
tion; it does not mandate "reasonable measures" to avoid conflicted rep-
resentation. A lawyer who takes reasonable measures may still violate
Rule 1.7. Is the Committee now saying that a lawyer who does not auto-
matically violates Rule 1.7?
Second, the Committee warns Ted of malpractice exposure, and of his
vulnerability to a motion to disqualify if he represents the landlord, even
75. See Op. 411, % 21. If Ted had agreed to maintain confidentiality, Ted may not be
able to inform his landlord-client of the problem at all.
76. Possible consequences for Ted range from providing some legal services without a
fee (to undo the damage) to losing the client altogether.
77. Op. 411, 20.
78. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.7(b) (1998).
79. See Op. 411, 24.
80. See Op. 411, % 22.
81. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.7, cmt. [1] (1998).
82. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope [11 (1983).
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without his having agreed to confidentiality.8 3 The Opinion fails to ex-
pand upon the basis of the malpractice claim. Perhaps malpractice law is
a better source of a duty of reasonable care to avoid conflicts of interest,
rather than an obligation added by interpretation to the Model Rules.
The theory supporting a motion to disqualify would be that the informa-
tion is "entitled to protection. '84 In the absence of either a client-lawyer
relationship, or a confidentiality agreement, express or implied, it is diffi-
cult to find a basis in ethics, if not in outrage, for Ting's client's
entitlement. 85
The Committee's solution to the problem of the consultation that later
becomes "un-anonymous" is, of course, prevention: the Opinion advises
Ted to learn who Ting's client is and to check for conflicts before consult-
ing.86 Again, curious advice, when Ted is not forming a client-lawyer re-
lationship with that person, and when the Committee elsewhere8 7
endorses the hypothetical consultation. When an anonymous hypotheti-
cal is impossible, the Committee advises Ted to learn enough to be sure
that the consultation matter does not affect an existing client. 88 In those
cases where Ted commits to maintain confidentiality, Ted must also avoid
later undertaking adverse representation. Therefore, Ted must include
Ting's client within his own conflicts-checking system.89
The Committee further notes that no Rule 1.7(b) conflict would arise if
Ted obtains Ting's agreement that the consultation will impose no obliga-
tion on Ted to Ting's client.91) The conclusion of the opinion amplifies 91
this idea by suggesting that Ted obtain consent to "full" use of informa-
tion gained in the consultation. A single clause in the Opinion's conclu-
sion requires, almost as afterthought, that Ting be authorized by her
client to make such an agreement. 92 Could Ting's authorization be im-
plied, or must it be express? Given the breadth of implied authorization
the Committee accepts in the confidentiality section of its discussion, we
worry that the Committee would find an agreement based only on im-
plied authority. If Ted is a careful lawyer, Ting will not be able to consult
him without getting her client's advance consent.
X. BEHIND THE SCREEN
To ease the blow of Ted's disqualification, 93 the Committee offers Ted's
83. See Op. 411, 122.
84. Op. 411, 1 22.
85. Ting has a strong personal interest in winning this motion to disqualify. Ting's
failure to use these safeguards when consulting Ted may result in adverse use of Ting's
client's information and a malpractice action against Ting.
86. See Op. 411, 123.
87. See Op. 411, 1 6.
88. See Op. 411, 123.
89. See Op. 411, 9 24. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
90. See Op. 411, 9 25.
91. Rather than recaps.
92. Op. 411, 9 25.
93. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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client, or rather Ted and his law firm, the consolation of screening. The
ABA, and most states, do not permit a law firm to screen a member who
is individually unable to represent a client because of a conflict of inter-
est, at least without the client's consent.94 A footnote to the Opinion 95
suggests that, although a client or former client is not sufficiently pro-
tected by screening, a consenting "third person" may be. The footnote
indicates that the screening option depends upon the non-client's consent
to Ted's firm's adverse representation. Although this appears to be a spe-
cial deal for non-client consultors, it is an illusion. While screening is not
permitted "as a matter of right,"'96 clients and former clients may consent
to screening as a condition to permitting adverse representation by a for-
mer lawyer.97 So, now, non-clients can too. Big deal.98
In the Opinion's conclusion, the Committee reiterates that Ted's agree-
ment to protect confidential information would limit his representation of
a client with adverse interests.99 Ted must obtain consent, but it does not
specify whose. If comparable to a multiple-client conflict, then, to con-
tinue the adverse representation, Ted must secure the consent of both
Ting's client and his client or prospective client.100
Whether or not screening is attempted, it is difficult to see how Ting's
client's consent, in advance of Ted's, or Ted's firm's, later adverse repre-
sentation can be adequately informed. "Consultation," as defined in the
Model Rules, means communicating enough information for the client to
appreciate the significance of the matter in question.10 1 That this authori-
zation for Ting to agree that Ted assume no obligation as a result of learn-
ing confidential information would be based on adequate consultation is
at least pie in the sky.102 Difficult as it is to conceive of a client agreeing,
94. See generally ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
§ 51:2001-14 (1999).
95. See Op. 411 n.13.
96. Id.
97. If a former client "may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict," as
Comment [5] to Model Rule 1.7 notes, then she can condition that consent upon the
screening of the conflicted lawyer.
98. It may be a big deal, however, for Ting, whose failure to obtain a screening proviso
may prove an actionable disservice to her client.
99. See Op. 411, 26.
100. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7, cmt. 5 (1998).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Terminology [2] (1998).
102. The conversation might go something like this:
Atty: Now, I want to run this problem passed my lawyer friend, Walter Steele. He's an
expert in this area and could be extremely helpful in how we decide to proceed.
Client: O.K. Sounds good. How much will it cost?
Atty: Nothing (except the fee for my time). I'm not going to retain him. The problem is,
however, that he might not agree to discuss the case with me if I ask him to promise to
keep what I tell him confidential and not to represent any clients against you where what I
tell him could hurt you. He might be afraid that it will prevent him from representing
other clients, now or in the future.
Client: That concerns me. I don't want what I've told you to get to the other side or to
hurt me in the future. Can't you just tell him only what's already public.
Atty: If I do, I doubt I'll get advice that is worth much. I need you to agree that he is free




it is even more difficult to conceive of a lawyer who thinks her client will
agree. To avoid nearly always futile attempts to obtain explicit authoriza-
tion, Ting will rely upon implied authorization. 0 3 The Opinion's position
therefore, will pressure Ting to make her question to Ted more general,
less susceptible to later connection of information to client, and less effec-
tive. She should probably pray for a continuing legal education program
on the topic. That is the kind of perverse consequence Walter Steele
would relish.
XI. THE END??
The conclusion does not merely summarize the body of the opinion, it
occasionally adds new, undeveloped requirements. Lawyers should take
"some or all" of these measures: (1) keep the consultation anonymous or
hypothetical; (2) when actual client information is revealed, it should be
limited to the least disclosure necessary for consultation;' °4 (3) client con-
sent must precede disclosure that might waive the privilege or harm the
client; (4) the lawyer should not consult another lawyer who has repre-
sented the opposing party without making sure that the other lawyer will
not be doing so in this case; (5) the lawyer should be careful if consulting
another lawyer who typically represents clients on the other side of the
issue from her client; (6) the consulted lawyer should ask the consulting
lawyer if the latter knows whether the consulted lawyer or his firm has
ever represented anyone who might be involved in the matter; (7) (per-
haps inconsistent with the first suggestion) sometimes the consulted law-
yer should ask the identity of the party adverse to the consulting lawyer's
client; (8) the consulted lawyer should determine whether the informa-
tion about to be imparted is to be kept confidential, and then decide
whether to get more information so as to identify any conflict of interest;
(9) the consulted lawyer should ask the consulting lawyer's client to waive
any confidentiality or conflict-of-interest duty; and (10) the consulted
lawyer should obtain the consulting lawyer's client's agreement to screen
Client: What's the chance the information could fall into the wrong hands or come back to
hurt me later?
Atty: Well. . . . This lawyer, Steele, does not represent your opponent in this case and
hasn't in the past as far as I know. Nor does he tend to represent folks with whom you
might end up in litigation sometime in the future. But, of course, I cannot guarantee that
he or his law firm will never end up in a law suit against you.
Client: Remind me again. Why would I want to agree that Steele doesn't have to keep my
secret information confidential?
Atty: It may be the only way he'll agree to talk to me about the case.
Client: There's got to be other lawyers out there with whom you can consult on this issue
who will agree to keep what you tell them confidential.
Atty: I guess so.
Client: So why haven't you found one?
103. When a lawyer foregoes seeking explicit consent because she believes the client
will not give it, it is illogical to conclude that the lawyer can reasonably infer that authori-
zation is implied.




the consulted lawyer and permit the consulted lawyer's firm to undertake
adverse representation.
XII. THE FINAL? CRITIQUE
"You can't have it both ways," as the way above-average born skeptic
and plain talker might say. Ted's goal is to be a graybeard 10 5 with no
inconvenient obligation to a (non-paying) client. The Opinion drives Ted
to avoid disqualifying entanglements, thus to avoid either a formal rela-
tionship with Ting's client, or a promise106 of confidentiality. Ting's client
is driven to want either or both. Ting wants the help Ted can give, with-
out harm to her client. Thus, Ting and her client want promises. Ted and
his client want waivers. If there are no promises, Ting's general questions
may not produce enough helpful information. The anonymous hypotheti-
cal may be slightly more productive. The identifying "hypothetical" or
the hypothetical subject to springing identification10 7 raises the danger of
harm. Ting may have disclosed information beyond her implied authori-
zation. Ted may find himself obliged by a promise implied by the circum-
stances or the nature of the information. 108 The Opinion requires a pre-
consultation dance, as intricate as the Cotton-Eyed Joe, between Ting
and Ted.
XIII. EPILOGUE
In Opinion 98-411, the Committee on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility describes the ethical and practical concerns of lawyer-to-lawyer
consultations. Unfortunately, the Opinion fails to craft clear guidelines
for the profession. Concededly, the Committee embarked on uncharted
waters 09 using its common ethical sense as its compass. We think, how-
ever, that the Opinion raises more questions than it answers. For exam-
ple, Opinion 97-407 seems to be the embarrassing relative.' 10 How does
the Committee's advice in Opinion 98-411 relate to its advice of one year
before? Should the formalistic test of engagement be the sine qua non of
a client-lawyer relationship? For that matter, what constitutes "engage-
ment?" It seems as if the Committee was unwilling to join issue between
the closely related questions addressed by the two opinions. Another
shortcoming of Opinion 98-411 is the vagueness of its implied authoriza-
tion discussion. Does a lawyer reading the Opinion have clear guidance
about what client information she can reveal when seeking another law-
yer's advice? What difference does a lack of implied authority make if
she gets the consulted lawyer's agreement to keep the information confi-
105. We extend a pre-emptive apology to any possible honoree of this article who might
take offense at the use of this term. It probably avails as much as a pre-emptive abstract
waiver of adverse use of confidential information.
106. Express or implied. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 71-89 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
109. Obviously not a Corps of Engineers lake.
110. Rather than a fantastic spouse.
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dential? Finally, and this does not exhaust the list of open questions, how
are the consulting and consulted lawyers to work out the exactly opposing
advice the Committee gives to each? If both lawyers read and follow
Opinion 411, they will have tough negotiating over the ground rules of
the consultation. Is the loser acting unethically? We hope the Commit-
tee will soon revisit this important topic to address these questions.1 I
111. Perhaps some retired professional responsibility professor who totes a notebook
computer on the back of his motorcycle will write an article with all the answers.
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